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RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION AT THE
FTC: RULE OF REASON OR REIGN
OF CHAOS?
SETH

E. LIPNER*

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, the Supreme Court propounded a new approach to
the legality of territorial restrictions imposed by a manufacturer
upon its distributors. Reversing a ten-year old landmark case,'
the Court in Continental T. V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania,2 declared that
the legality of these restraints were henceforth to be judged
under the rule of reason, an approach requiring a broad inquiry
into the effect the restraint has upon competition. 3 Prior to Sylvania, these restraints had been deemed unlawful per se without regard to their competitive effect. 4 In part the product of a
change in membership, 5 the Court rested its Sylvania decision
upon a conviction that these restraints have procompetitive aspects. 6 However, the Court provided little guidance on how to
apply the rule of reason to the practice of territorial restraints.
Since 1977, the courts have struggled in applying the new
standard. The various circuits have developed different approaches and guidelines making the law far from uniform.7 A
similar phenomenon exists at the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). While this body generally speaks with only one voice, it
* B.S. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, J.D. Albany Law School,
LL.M. New York University School of Law. Assistant Professor of Law, Ber-

nard M. Baruch College. The author wishes to thank Ms. Helene Banks,
without whose assistance this article would not have been written.
1. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
2. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Sylvania, a T.V. manufacturer, had attempted to

limit the number of franchises in an area and to restrict retailers from selling Sylvania products outside their designated location.

3. Id. at 59.
4. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 379.
5. See Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. 1
(1978).

6. 433 U.S. at 54-57.
7. The various approaches taken by the circuit courts differ greatly.
For instance, the Second Circuit takes a tough approach to vertical restraints in Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980),
concluding that an anticompetitive impact on intraband competition can
alone support a finding that § 1 of the Sherman Act has been violated. However, in Borger v. Yamaha Intern. Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1980), the

Second Circuit used a more lenient approach to vertical restraints stating
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has in the years since Sylvania produced two opinions expressing divergent points of view. The first opinion was rendered in
a case involving the practices of the Coca-Cola Company, 8 while
the second involved Beltone, the nationally known manufacturer of hearing aids. 9 These opinions, which are the subject of
this article, have added little to the development of a rational
body of law in this complex area. The first two parts of this article will discuss, respectively, the FTC's decisions in the two
cases. The third part will then attempt to accomplish that which
the FTC did not: develop a rational and useful approach to vertical restraint cases through comparison of the problems
presented by these two cases.
PART I: COCA-COLA
Only a year after Sylvania, the Federal Trade Commissioners were confronted with a challenge to the territorial restraints
imposed by the Coca-Cola Company on its distributors.'0 Reversing the administrative law judge's finding of reasonableness," the FTC concluded that Coca-Cola's system violated
12
Commissection 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
sioner Dole, writing for the majority, analyzed the competitive
benefits and burdens of the Coca-Cola scheme. Her conclusion
that the purpose or effect of the restraint must be harmful to both inter-

brand competition and intrabrand competition for a finding of illegality.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits adopted a different approach. Both circuits relied heavily on the effects on interbrand competition through analysis of market share. For decisions in the Fifth Circuit see, e.g., Mendelovitz
v. Adolph Coor Co., 693 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v.
Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid
Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981). For

decisions in the Ninth Circuit see, e.g., Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v.
Fiat Distrib., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981);

Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 446 U.S.
965 (1980). The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.

Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir.
1982).
In further contrast, the Sixth Circuit deals with vertical restraints by
analyzing the nature of the restraints. See, e.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Serv-

ice Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982); Clairol, Inc. v. Boston Discount Center of Berkeley, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1979).

Evidencing yet another approach to vertical restraints, at least one
court emphasized the existence of reasonable justification of the restraint

such as the free rider and new entrant rationales. See Donald B. Rice Tire
Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
864 (1980).
8. In re Coca-Cola, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978).
9. In re Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982).
10. In re Coca-Cola, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978).

11. Id. at 609-10.
12. Id. at 609.
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was that the restraints produced an unreasonable reduction in
competition in the market; the practice therefore had to be
3
stopped.'
The Coca-Cola Company, since the time it began to sell the
rights to bottle its product and license its trademark, had done
so only through exclusive territories granted to bottlers.' 4 The
bottlers, after purchasing the necessary soft drink syrups from
Coke, would add carbonated water, put the product in containers, and distribute it to the various retail establishments, vending machines and other sales outlets.' 5 By granting exclusive
territories, the bottlers, who are independent from Coke,' 6 were
precluded from competing with each other in the sale of bottled,
canned and pre-mixed soft drink products made from syrup
manufactured by Coca-Cola. 17 Other major soft drink manufac8
turers engaged in a similar system of territorial exclusivity.'
Commissioner Dole, after rejecting the suggestion that the
restraints were illegal per se under United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,'9 addressed the relationship between the question
of reasonableness and a firm's market power.20 Coca-Cola had
argued that without "excessive market power," its restraint
could not affect the resale price of its product; therefore, re13. Id.
14. Id. at 608. At the beginning of this century, the Coca-Cola Company

sold its right to bottle Coca-Cola and licensed its trademark to private investors who owned and operated their own plants within their assigned territories. Id. at 607.
15. Id. at 627. Coca-Cola refused to yield the secret Coca-Cola syrup
formula to the bottlers, which would have enabled them to produce the
syrup themselves. Id. at 608. It later adopted a similar policy for its allied
products as they were introduced. Id. Therefore, the Coca-Cola Company
is the bottlers, only source of the Coca-Cola and allied products syrup.
16. The Coca-Cola Company now operates 27 bottling plants of its own,
resulting from the reacquisition of the bottling rights which had been previously granted to local bottlers. Id. at 607. These plants operate in exclusive
territories subject to the same limitations previously imposed upon the acquired bottler. Id. at 613. Thus, Coca-Cola "merely replaced an independent bottler within a preexisting distribution scheme." Id. This had no
significant effect on the restraints or the territorial relationships of existing
bottlers. "The rest of [the] bottlers are. . . independent businessmen who
conduct [their businesses] as they see fit." Id. at 608.
17. Id. at 609.
18. Id. at 640-41; see In re Pepsico, Inc. 91 F.T.C. 680, 698-99 (1978) (competitor ordered to cease practice of territorial exclusivity).
19. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Topco involved a conspiracy among firms at the
same level of competition, a so-called "horizontal" restraint. These restraints continue to be treated as illegal per se, even after Sylvania. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 n.27. On the other hand, the Coca-Cola case, as well as In
Re Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982) (see infra text accompanying note 82), involved agreements between firms at different levels of the
distribution system. These restraints are denominated "vertical."
20. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 618-19.
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duced competition amongst sellers of Coke could not be economically harmful. 2 1 Commissioner Dole rejected the argument
as contrary to the precepts of Sylvania.22 The fact that the
23
Supreme Court had not approved Sylvania's location clause
suggested to Commissioner Dole that market power was not a
24
Even though Sylvania's
prerequisite to a finding of illegality.

share of the market was relatively small,25 the Court nevertheless remanded the case to the lower court for consideration
under the rule of reason. 26 If a finding of excessive market
power had been required for a finding of unreasonableness, then
remand would have been unnecessary. Absence of market
power, said Commissioner Dole, was important to a finding of
reasonableness. Absence of that power, however, did not automatically produce exoneration. 27 Nevertheless, it was noted
that some market power was present, particularly because the
Coca-Cola trademark has great competitive significance in the
soft drink industry. The market power was sufficient such that
the restraints constituted, "a serious impediment to free market
forces and [tended to] diminish competition in the [market
place] .- 28

21. Id. Coca-Cola argued that since it had not been proven to have

"dominant or monopoly" power, interbrand competition would prevent
changes in the price of its product. See Answer Brieffor Respondent, at 1216, 45, 47, 49, 54; In re Coca-Cola, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Respondent's Brief].
22. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 619.
23. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
24. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 618-19. Commissioner Dole referred to the
case of United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), in which the court summarized the doctrine of reasonable
restraints and listed the absence of monopoly power merely as a prerequisite to, but not a definitive determinant of, a finding of reasonableness.
25. 433 U.S. at 38. Sylvania's market share had declined to 1% to 2% of
national television sales when they instituted the new franchise plan which
brought their market share up to 5% in three years. Id.
26. Id. at 59. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 1046 (1978), affid, 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1982).
27. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 618-19. The FTC refers to Sylvania as a case
in point, where "a less sweeping restraint" was tested for reasonableness
despite the fact that Sylvania did not possess dominant or monopoly power
but had only a very small market share.
28. Id. at 618-19. The restraints imposed by Coca-Cola, according to the
FTC, have successfully suppressed, if not eliminated, intrabrand competition in several important soft drink product lines. This has resulted in a
distortion of the competitive dynamics of the industry and a disruption of
the natural economic forces which would have caused significant changes
in the geographic market boundaries of bottlers. Id. at 622-23. It was noted
that originally the boundaries were probably a reflection of natural geographic boundaries due to transportation and technological barriers inherent in the early 20th century. However, with improvements in
transportation and technological advances these boundaries have become
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After looking closely at the effects of the territorial divisions
by Coca-Cola, the FTC found a substantial lessening of competition.29 The opinion stated that the territorial plan, formulated at
the turn of this century, did not produce the economies of scale
which bottlers require. The currently drawn territories were too
small for some bottlers to reap the advantages of modern technology. 30 Geographic expansion would permit these bottlers to
reach optimal size, allowing them to realize production, transportation and marketing efficiencies. 3 1 Therefore, the effect of
the territorial division was to stifle the growth of these bottling
companies.
Coca-Cola had argued that it was desirable to keep these
territories small, asserting that a company with "a limited field
to till obviously has to till it better in order to get the most out of
''
it. 32 Greater market penetration would then be assured, with
Coke products appearing in every conceivable location.3 3 As the
obsolete. The result was a network of artificially maintained territories impervious to the benefits of market evolution and expansion. Id.
29. Id. at 644. The FTC pointed specifically to the lessening of competition in the delivery services bottlers offered to their customers. The bottlers used a route-delivery system, or a store-to-store delivery system as it
was called, in which the bottler brought the product directly to the customer's store. With the growth of the chain store and use of nonrefillable
containers, this method of distribution has become unnecessary and in
many cases undesirable. Retailers have expressed a great demand for alternative methods of distribution such as central warehousing and plant
pick-up by central warehousing customers. The bottlers were unable to
provide these services under the territorial restraints imposed by CocaCola. The bottlers testified that they preferred store-to-store delivery because it allowed them to maintain some control over the merchandising of
their products. Id. at 624. Implicit in that contention is their desire to maintain their exclusive territories. It is clear, therefore, that the territorial restrictions impeded the growth of an important aspect of nonprice
competition in the soft drink industry, competition in delivery services
offered.
30. Id. See supra note 28.
31. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 622. Coca-Cola argued that geographic expansion was not a necessary prerequisite to realizing these efficiencies because the bottling industry has clearly taken advantage of the benefits of
technological advancements. See Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 622 (citing Respondent's Brief, supra note 21, at 81.) Coca-Cola pointed to improvements
in transportation and production of their products which had resulted in
markedly greater production efficiency and potential capacity. The products were delivered by trucks and the production line was fully automated.
There were machines to mix the syrup, wash the bottles and fill and cap
them. However, the opinion stated that even with this potential, growth in
production had not been fully exploited because of the territorial restrictions placed on the bottlers. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 622.
32. Id. at 628 (quoting Transcript 696, Respondent's Proposed Findings
84). This statement was made by the President of the Coca-Cola Company
in explanation of why exclusive territories encourage market penetration.
33. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 627. According to Coke officials, the belief
that deep market penetration was crucial in selling soft drinks had led bottlers to service numerous unprofitable "vending machine accounts, small
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FTrC pointed out, however, a portion of this market is often unprofitable for the bottlers, 34 with the benefits of extreme market

penetration inuring mostly to the manufacturer. 35 But the costs
of this penetration fell on the bottlers, and often produced price
distortions at the retail level.36 Commissioner Dole termed this
37
phenomenon "free riding" by Coca-Cola on its bottler's efforts.
This reverse free rider analysis is unique to rule of reason
cases. The usual free rider analysis justifies market division by
postulating the effect a non-promoting seller has upon those
who promote and service a product.3 8 The seller who does not
expend efforts to promote his product can sell at a lower price
than his intrabrand competitor, thus reducing the latter's incentive to engage in such promotions. One with an exclusive territory, however, need not fear the free riding discounters, thus
raising the seller's incentive to promote the product involved.
Coca-Cola, like Sylvania, tried to use the free rider analysis
to defend its exclusive territories. 39 The FTC rejected the argument.40 While bottlers may be reluctant, absent the exclusive
grants, to engage in certain image-enhancing promotion, there
was no reason to believe that consumer recognition of Cocaoutlets and 'special events'," so that coke products would always be within
an "arm's-reach of desire." Id. at 627-28.
34. Although the majority of "special events" the bottlers serviced were
unprofitable, the bottlers claimed such events were necessary in order to
develop a market training people to drink Coca-Cola and to develop "product awareness to make the larger accounts profitable." Id. at 628.
35. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
36. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 628-29. The FTC explained that the bottlers
charged the same price to each of their customers irrespective of the actual
cost to service that customer. That is, despite differences in delivery costs
each customer was charged a level price. This resulted in the subsidizing of
the overall cost of market penetration by those retailers who cost bottlers
less to service than other retailers. This added cost would eventually be
passed on by retailers to the consumer in the form of higher prices. Id. See
infra text accompanying notes 162-64.
37. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 628.
38. Id. See also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55. Commissioner Dole believed
that the elimination of exclusive territories would cause bottlers to abandon
level pricing in exchange for a system where the price charged to retailers
more closely reflected the actual cost of servicing each individual retailer.
She further suggested that bottlers could institute minimum volume requirements or encourage plant pick-up delivery for those accounts that
would otherwise be unprofitable. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 629.
39. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 629-31.
40. Id. at 631. The FTC noted that in this case the burden of the restraint exceeded the advertising benefits it was said to encourage. For the
past 75 years Coca-Cola and its bottlers had operated under the present
system of exclusive territories. The promotional activities, however, had
not yet produced the expected benefits, namely lowering retail prices and
eliminating barriers to entry. The record clearly showed that intrabrand
competition was necessary to produce the pressure to achieve these benefits. Id. at 629-30.
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Cola would suffer greatly as a result. 41 The well established

company of Coca-Cola is not as dependent upon distributor advertising as a newcomer or a faltering firm.4 2 Furthermore, it

was likely that the bottlers would continue to promote CocaCola products as a way to stimulate sales. 43 However, the focus

of that promotion might change. For example, pricing, sales
terms and related services would become more prominent in advertising, enhancing customer knowledge, and therefore intrabrand competition. 44 The effect of the territorial division was
exactly the opposite, and the FTC believed that a change would
be procompetitive. 45 Similarly, the FTC rejected the argument
that the restraint was necessary to ensure the quality of the bottler's product. Less restrictive alternatives are available, and
the restraint on competition was not "reasonably necessary to
ensure [the quality of the product] .,46
41. Id. at 631.
42. Id. For an extended discussion on the legality of these defenses, see
supra note 5, at 1.
43. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 631. The FTC stated that without exclusive
territories "the bottlers would have every incentive to price promote their
products in competition with intrabrand bottlers and to convey information
relating to the terms of sale or the competitive packaging or service alternatives they may offer to their potential purchasers, the soft drink retailer."
Id. at 630-31. Thus, advertising might not diminish. Rather, there would
merely be a shift in the focus of the advertising from image enhancement to
price and informational promotion. Id.
44. Id. at 630-31.
45. Id. at 631.
46. Id. at 634. The respondents contended that the territorial restrictions were necessary to maintain quality control in both manufacturing and
distribution. They argued that limiting the number of the bottlers' potential
customers would force the bottlers to uphold product quality to minimize
the risk of losing customers. Moreover, the respondents contended that the
restrictions allowed them to monitor each bottler's product quality. Id. at
631-32.
The FTC rejected these arguments because the nature of the restraint
was unconnected to quality control and because less restrictive alternatives
existed. The Coca-Cola Company engaged in unscheduled routine inspections of both the bottling plants and the bottled products. There is no reason to think that these inspections could not take place without the
territorial restrictions. The inspections were totally unrelated to the area in
which the bottled products were retailed. Although facilitated by the restraints, quality control at the retail level can be maintained by requiring
each bottler to identify itself on the product. The FTC decided that in this
case "quality control and intrabrand competition [were I not incompatible."
Id. at 634. The FTC referred to Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d
570 (1982) for clarification. Id. at 633. In Coors, the court stated that the
territorial restrictions used by the brewer were "essential to the efficient
functioning of its quality control procedures." Id. at 576. Thus, the court
noted a standard for quality justification of territorial restraints. However,
application of this standard to the Coca-Cola system of restraints yielded
the decision that the restraints are not reasonably necessary to maintain
quality control.
REDLICH,
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Having completed the analysis of the restraint's effect upon
intrabrand competition, the FTC's discussion turned to interbrand effects. Previously, the administrative law judge upheld
the market division relying on Sylvania for the proposition that
competition would serve as
the presence of vigorous interbrand
47
restraints.
intrabrand
a check on
The administrative law judge stressed the existence of large
numbers of soft drink brands. 48 The FTC, however, differed with
the judge on how to properly assess the level of interbrand
checks. An accurate assessment requires a careful study of
not merely
competitive interaction amongst competing bottlers,
49
competitors.
of
number
the
at
look
a superficial
For example, Commissioner Dole analyzed the effect of a
practice known as "piggybacking," a bottler's production and
sale of the soft drinks of two or more companies. 50 This practice
has the effect of limiting interbrand price competition because a
bottler would prefer to price all of his brands at relatively equal
51
prices, rather than engage in price competition with himself.
Furthermore, piggybacking increases concentration at the bottler level. 52 Thus, simply naming and counting brand names is
not an accurate measure of the degree and intensity of interbrand competition.
The FTC attempted to assess the level of interbrand competition. While some interbrand competition within each territory
did subsist with these territorial restraints,53 bottlers of beverages which compete with Coca-Cola products were insulated
from competition from all but one Coca-Cola bottler. Actual and
47. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
48. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 635. The judge relied on a lengthy list of
brands or trade names of beverages all of which compete to some degree
with Coca-Cola. Id. at 549-53. The Coca-Cola bottlers who testified demonstrated, however, that flavored carbonated soft drinks offered the most intense competition to Coca-Cola products. Id. at 635. Thus, it was the
interbrand competition with suppliers of those products that the FTC
considered.
49. Id. at 635-39.
50. Id. at 636-39. The FTC noted that piggybacking is used extensively
in the soft drink bottling industry. The respondents argued that it evidences intense interbrand competition, rationalizing that when consumers
buy soft drinks they are confronted with the various brands, each in compe-

tition with the other, regardless of who the bottler was. The FTC rejected

the argument asserting that the practice worked a substantial reduction of
competition at the bottler level. Id.

51. Id. at 637.
52. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 638. In each territory observed there were a
large number of brands available to the public; however, the bottling of

those brands was controlled by only a few bottlers, making the intensity of
interbrand competition questionable. Id.
53. Id. at 636-37.
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potential interbrand competition were thus largely curtailed.5 4
The problem was compounded by the fact that Pepsi, CocaCola's largest competitor, engages in a similar practice. 55 The
typical result was that pricing levels, or at least pricing policies,
varied markedly from territory to territory. 56 Removal of the
territorial restraints would cause these pricing policies to clash
in a competitive environment.5 7 Thus, the complete elimination
of intrabrand competition by Coca-Cola had, in fact, produced
less vigorous competition. 58 Commissioner Dole thus concluded
that intrabrand competition must be injected into the market.
Commissioner Clanton dissented. 59 Although he was unable to identify any specific procompetitive effects, his opinion is
punctuated with calls for additional evidence. 60 He conceded, as
did the respondent, that the territorial divisions worked a complete elimination of intrabrand competition. 6 1 Nevertheless,
Commissioner Clanton believed that the majority did not employ the kind of analysis mandated by Sylvania.62 According to
his opinion, there was insufficient consideration given to possible interbrand benefits and too much emphasis on anticompeti63
tive effects.
54. Id. at 639-43.
55. Id. at 640.
56. Id. Respondents argued that disparities in wholesale prices were
not indicative of limitations on interbrand competition but are due to alternative pricing policies of the bottler. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 641 (citing Respondent's Brief, supra note 21, at 75 & 88). The FTC rejected this argument
theorizing that the real reason pricing policies vary from territory to territory is that the level of interbrand competition varies from territory to territory depending upon a variety of factors. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 639-40.
57. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 642. The FTC regards the uncertain outcome
of such a confrontation as the "essence of competition which the present
system of territorial restrictions ...

eliminates." Id.

58. Id. at 644. Since Coca-Cola is the nation's leading flavored carbonated soft drink brand, interbrand price competition is highly sensitive to the
effects of Coca-Cola's intrabrand price competition. Id. The elimination of
that intrabrand price competition has an adverse effect on interbrand competition in the industry as a whole. Id.
59. In re Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. 517, 589-06 (1976) (Clanton, C., dissenting).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 592.
62. Id. at 595. The analysis mandated by Sylvania entails a delicate balancing of the effects of the restriction on competition, weighing the benefits
to interbrand competition against the harm done to intrabrand competition.
433 U.S. at 54-55. The Supreme Court elaborated upon this standard in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978),
where it stated that the rule of reason requires a balancing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects in an effort to determine net competitive
effect.
63. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 594 (Clanton, C., dissenting). Commissioner
Clanton feels that the FTC wrongfully stressed that "the restraints are no
longer justified primarily because of changed conditions affecting distribution," rather than concentrating on "the reasons advanced for imposing
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According to the dissent, the record lacked sufficient detail
on the effects the restraint had upon pricing. 64 While Commissioner Clanton agreed with Commissioner Dole that the level
pricing used in bottler sales can be harmful to competition, a
detailed inquiry into Coke's market power and cost structure
would be necessary to support such a finding.65 Removal of the
restraint might produce more intrabrand competition, but Commissioner Clanton believed that this fact did not, in itself, dictate a finding of unreasonableness. 66 The dissent reasoned that
the level pricing structure could be the most efficient method of
producing the high availability and market penetration which
67
Liftrespondent claimed was crucial to its business success.
ing the exclusivity of the territories would, as the majority had
argued, change the nature of the bottler advertising and put the
onus of promoting the image of the brand on the syrup manufacturer. 68 But Commissioner Clanton was unable to agree that
such a shift would necessarily produce greater efficiency in advertising.69 Unlike the majority, he seemed undisturbed by the
70
burden thus placed upon the bottlers.
The dissent accused the majority of substituting its view of
what is in the consumer's best interest for that of the company.7 ' Commissioner Clanton was unwilling to go as far as
such restraints and their effect on interbrand competition," as mandated by
Sylvania. Id. at 592-93.
64. Commissioner Clanton believed the record was insufficient concerning the actual cost incurred by the bottlers for each retailer. Thus, the effects of level pricing were indeterminant because it was unknown "whether
...cost differentials reflect[ed] legitimate promotional considerations or
represent[ed] a form of price discrimination . . . ." Id. at 595. Furthermore, if the restriction were enjoined then the actual effect on the consumer
would be unknown. Would the consumer benefit from variable pricing and
alternate means of distribution more so than he would suffer from less competition over availability? Id. at 595-96.
65. Id. at 604-05.
66. Id. at 598. Commissioner Clanton believed that such an analysis
does not satisfy the requirements set forth in Sylvania. He asserted that
further inquiry must be made "concerning the procompetitive aspects of
the challenged restrictions and their overall effect on interbrand competition." Id. at 595.
67. Id. at 597-98.
68. Id. at 631.
69. Id. at 595. Commissioner Clanton believed that the record conveyed
no evidence that the advertising strategy of Coca-Cola was currently inefficient. The FrC's belief, that much of Coca-Cola's advertising was unnecessary due to widespread recognition of the Coke trademark, was merely an
opinion unsupported by factual analysis. Lifting the exclusivity of territories, Clanton revealed, may simply result in "a shift to less efficient methods of obtaining the same promotional effects." Id. at 596 (quoting
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 n. 25 (1977).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
71. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 597.
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Commissioner Dole without more guidance from the record.
Commissioner Clanton stated:
To conclude, as the majority seems to imply, that the availability of
suitable marketing approaches less restrictive of intrabrand competition is sufficient to find a violation, places the Commission in
the difficult position of having to make its own judgment about the
without regard to their imcommercial merits of various strategies
72
pact on interbrand competition.
Economic theory states that the manufacturer will be punished
73
Comby the market place for inefficient marketing strategies.
missioner Clanton, endorsing this theory, apparently believed
that there was no need for the FTC to intervene.
Commissioner Clanton took issue with the majority over the
significance of soft drink brand piggybacking. 74 While he admitted that the practice leads to less price competition, it may be
that piggybacking is a response to high entry barriers or vigorous competition for bottler's services. In fact, the dissenter asserted that piggybacking may actually lower barriers to new
entry for manufacturers unable to meet the steep capital requirements of bottling.7 5 Thus, piggybacking may actually be
beneficial to competition. It was therefore asserted that the true
effect of piggybacking in particular, and the territorial restraint
in general, cannot be analyzed without more evidence. 76 Even
though wholesale prices would in some instances be lower if the
exclusivity were enjoined, Commissioner Clanton asserted that
it is still impossible to discern properly the pricing relationship
between Coke, Pepsi and other soft drinks without market definition and evidence of Coke's market share.77 Therefore, Commissioner Clanton would have 8remanded the case for further
7
study of Coke's market power.
Following the FTC's decision, Coca-Cola and the soft drink
industry stepped up their campaign for federal legislation which
would permit them to engage in restricted distribution and territorial restraints. A new statute was passed, requiring an antitrust complainant, such as the FTC, to prove that interbrand
competition in the market for soft drinks is less than "substantial and effective." 79 The FTC's order in Coca-Cola was then set
aside by the courts, and remanded to the Commission for addi72. Id.

73. See generally, Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).

74. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 601-02.
75. Id. at 602.
76. Id.

77. Id. at 602-03.
78. Id. at 606.
79. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3501-3503 (1980).
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tional proceedings. 80 To date, there have been none.
PART II: BELTONE

The FTC again confronted the issue of the legality of territorial restraints in In re Beltone Electronics Corp.81 Beltone dealt

with the practices of manufacturers of hearing aids. The hearing aid industry had generally sought to confine distributors of
hearing aids to exclusive territories. Several companies, such as
Beltone, engaged in a scheme of product exclusivity, prohibiting
their dealers from selling the hearing aids of other manufacturers. Four of the major companies had signed consent decrees
with the FTC barring exclusivity, but Beltone refused and a proceeding against it followed. 82 Administrative Law Judge Miles
Brown followed the Sylvania decision and ruled that Beltone's
system was unreasonable. 83 Judge Brown found an adverse impact on both intrabrand and interbrand competition.8 4 An appeal to the FTC followed.
Beltone's system of restraints did not produce "air tight" exclusivity. 85 The FTC, however, considered the restraint a traditional territorial division because the restraint significantly
reduced intrabrand competition. 86 Nevertheless, the FTC held
80. Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Vertical restraints imposed by Royal Crown Cola also became the subject of litigation,
in which that company's practices were declared lawful under the rule of
reason. See First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164 (9th
Cir. 1980). That case was decided by a jury under the traditional rule of
reason standard, not under the approach contained in the new statute.
81. In re Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982).
82. Id. at 223 (Bailey, C., concurring).
83. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 146.
84. Id. at 179. Administrative Law Judge Brown had previously rendered a decision of illegality in this case applying the per se rule as demanded by United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
However, in 1978 when Sylvania overruled Schwinn, the case was remanded for further inquiry under the rule of reason in order to assess properly respondent's appeal to the Commission.
85. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 193.
86. Id. Beltone's dealership agreements were not expressly restrictive;
however, the ALJ treated them as traditional restraints because they "created an atmosphere of intimidation and coercion which has produced de
facto exclusive dealing as well as territorial and customer restrictions. ..

."

Id. at 183.

The Beltone system "has been sustained primarily through the efforts
of supervisory personnel known as 'home office field executives' or
HOFES." Id. The HOFES ensure that each dealer attains his given sales
goal, or "potential," within his "Area of Primary Marketing Responsibility"
(APMR). Id. HOFES are instructed by Beltone that termination of a dealership agreement cannot be based on a dealer's selling of a Beltone competitive brand nor on a dealer's selling of Beltone products outside his APMR.
Id. However, a dealer's failure to achieve deep market penetration within
his APMR, evidenced by his failure to achieve his potential, is viable
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that the practice was reasonable.8 7 Interbrand considerations
were declared to be of primary importance. 8 8 Writing for the
FTC,Commissioner Clanton found that interbrand competition
was sufficiently vigorous to alleviate any negative effect on intrabrand competition.8 9
The Beltone case is not particularly noteworthy for its emphasis upon interbrand competition. Sylvania and a good portion of its progeny had similar emphasis, 90 even if Coca-Cola
had not. But the Beltone opinion expressly required that a complainant demonstrate an adverse impact on interbrand competition, a step the FTC did not take in any previous cases.9 1 Under
grounds for dealership termination. Id. Dealers are encouraged and advised by the HOFES to concentrate their efforts on achieving or increasing
their potential. Id. Several dealers testified that this goal could only be
achieved by selling Beltone products exclusively and each within his assigned APMR. Id. Thus, the system results in de facto vertical restraints.
Beltone argued, however, that "the voluntary decision by the majority of its
dealers to devote primary attention to Beltone products is not legally
equivalent to exclusive dealing." Id. at 183-84. The ALJ rejected this argument concluding that the "de facto exclusivity is unlawful because it raises
entry barriers and exacerbates the loss of intrabrand competition caused by
customer and territorial restrictions." Id. at 185.
87. Id. at 218.
88. Id. at 196. Commissioner Clanton reviewed the post-Sylvania case
law to point out the importance of interbrand effects in cases concerning
vertical restrictions. See Red Diamond Supply Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic
Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1006 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981) (court
observed that vertical restraints might have increased rather than injured
competition); Cowley v. Braden Indus. Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980) (court found restraints reasonable in absence of
evidence of injury to interbrand competition); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of
America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (court found no basis in Sylvania for
the position that adverse intrabrand effects alone cannot support a violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390
(2d Cir. 1980) (court held reversible error to instruct the jury to find defendant liable solely on intrabrand competition); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980) ajd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th
Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981) (court demanded more rigorous analysis of the competitive effects of non-price vertical restraints).
89. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 218.
90. See supra note 7.
91. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 208. For example, in Coca-Cola the FTC condemned the vertical restraint based on its elimination of intrabrand competition and the existence of less restrictive alternatives. Coca-Cola,91 F.T.C.
at 633, 644. There was no lengthy analysis of the level of interbrand competition or of the effects the restraint had on interbrand competition. It is interesting to note that Commissioner Clanton wrote the dissenting opinion
of the case, calling for a further inquiry into the level of interbrand competition. Id. at 589 (Clanton, C., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note
59-78.
The FTC in Beltone cited one prior FTC opinion, In re Amway Corp.,
Inc., 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979), an opinion by then-Commissioner Pitofsky.
Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 194. It is ironic, for two reasons, that Commissioner
Clanton cites this case in support of his Beltone standard. First, the case
was decided under the per se rule, not the rule of reason which Mr. Clanton
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the articulated standard, a showing of a reduction of intrabrand
competition is necessary in order for the complainant to prevail,
92
no matter how great the reduction.
The Beltone opinion discussed in significant detail the question of how to assess the level of interbrand competition in a
rule of reason case. 93 Initially, Commissioner Clanton focused
the analysis on three potential anticompetitive interbrand effects: (1) promotion of actual collusion among competitors;
(2) promotion of interdependent behavior; and (3) enhancement or creation of market power on the part of one or more
sellers.94 The most extreme case is the first category which is
95
typically dealt with as a horizontal conspiracy under Topco,
i.e., as a per se violation. The second and third categories, however, must be addressed through the rule of reason, and the FTC
96
proceeded to do so.
Regarding interdependence, Commissioner Clanton drew
from "available economic literature" those factors which characterize a market susceptible to that type of behavior. 97 Foremost
are the number of sellers and the degree of concentration in the
market. The opinion stated that the hearing aid industry is not
highly concentrated, and that the number of sellers is increasing. 98 Other enumerated characteristics of interdependent beso vigorously espouses. Second, Commissioner Pitofsky is one of the remaining stalwarts who finds fault with most territorial restraints. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical
Restrictions, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978).
92. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 196, 208. In writing the majority opinion, Commissioner Clanton attempted to facilitate application of the Sylvania decision by forging a procedural analysis of "interbrand effects and the
contribution (positive or negative) that . . . [on-price vertical restraints]
make to that level of competition." Id. at 206.
93. Id. at 197.
94. Id. at 206-07.
95. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). There
remains some question as to the viability of Topco after Sylvania. See Redlich, supra note 5, at 51 n. 397.
96. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 207-13. For analysis by the courts of such interbrand considerations as market concentration and market power see Red
Diamond Supply Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1005-06 (5th
Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co.,
651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980) affid 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 864 (1981); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 1982-2 Trade
Cases (CCH)
64,744 at 71,606 (7th Cir. 1982).
97. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 210-11.
98. Id. at 211. Complaint counsel argued that the changes in the market
have resulted from the consent orders signed by other companies precluding them from using exclusive dealing arrangements. Thus, barriers to entry were lowered and the industry experienced growth and expansion. The
FTC rejected this argument based on evidence that recent market trends
were due to independent factors. But see infra text accompanying note 157.
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havior, such as product homogeneity, barriers to entry, rising
demand and others, indicated that this market is not overly susceptible to industry coordination. 99 However, the FTC did not
consider, as it had in Coca-Cola, the mechanics by which the
territorial restraint might facilitate interdependent behavior.
The FTC considered the argument that exclusivity enhanced Beltone's market power and restricted consumer choice
at the buyer level.10 0 But the argument was rejected. 10 1 There
was no proof that Beltone had been able to extract "inordinately
higher prices" for its product; in fact Beltone's market share had
actually declined in recent years. 102 Had this not been the case,
the FTC would have looked further into Beltone's market
power. 10 3 In this case, however, such an inquiry was deemed
unnecessary. Even Beltone's requirement that its dealers sell
only Beltone products, a stricture which admittedly produces
some foreclosure of competing sellers, was insufficient to neces10 4
sitate such an inquiry.
Having concluded that the restraint could not have reduced
interbrand competition, Commissioner Bailey, in a concurring
opinion, 0 5 stated that the inquiry should have ceased at that
point. 0 6 Nevertheless, Commissioner Clanton went on to ad99. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 207, 211 n.59. The products and sales terms of
hearing aid manufacturers and dealers were found to be heterogeneous, ev-

idenced by diverse costs, market shares, objectives and other significant
factors. The FTC further noted that, though the demand for hearing aids is
evidently finite, the market "has not yet been fully tapped," making new
entry very possible and collusion less profitable. Id. at 211. Despite the inelastic demand caused by low price sensitivity in the hearing aid industry,
there is vigorous non-price competition which is, as the FC pointed out,
highly responsive to the "special needs of buyers." Id. at 212.
100. Id. at 212.
101. Id.
102. Id. Although Beltone was still the leading firm in the market at that

time, its market share dropped from 21% to 16% inbetween the years of 1972
to 1977. Id. at 210. This decline can be attributed to Beltone's failure to fully
penetrate the recently expanding professional referral market (discussed

infra text accompanying notes 108-10) and the success of new entrants into
the hearing aid industry.
103. The FrC explained that, in the instance that Beltone's prices were
found to be "inordinately higher" than its competitors, a further inquiry
into the non-price promotional activity of such a "service oriented market"
as the hearing aid industry would prove to be very enlightening. Id. at 212.

104. Id. at 209-10. The actual amount of foreclosure produced by
Beltone's exclusive dealing arrangements was found to be 16% of market
sales or 7 to 8% of dealers. Id. Such a degree of foreclosure is "neither
clearly de minimus nor clearly indicative of significant market power," the
FrC explained, and is therefore highly inconclusive. Id. at 204. However,

the F C found that further inquiry into Beltone's market power was unnecessary due to vigorous interbrand competition and the occurrence of new
entry and destabilizing growth.
105. Id. at 221.
106. Id. at 221-22.
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dress the validity of Beltone's purported justification. 10 7 In order to do so, he had to study the methods of competition
employed by industry members. In the case of hearing aids,
several marketing techniques are in general use. Historically,
the principal technique was lead advertising; where advertisements are placed in local, regional and national media to attract
the attention of potential customers. l0 8 Customers remove a
coupon from the ad and return it to the manufacturer, who then
turns the "lead" over to the dealer assigned to that customer's
territory. 10 9 Hearing aid dealers, including those franchised by
Beltone, often engaged in their own lead advertising. Leads,
however, account for only a quarter of Beltone dealer's sales." 0
The remaining sales are generated through walk-ins, user
repurchases, and professional referrals by doctors and audiologists."' In recent years, the referral method has been encouraged due to Food and Drug Administration rulings
requiring dealers to advise potential customers to seek exami12
nation by a professional prior to purchasing a hearing device.'
As a result, the referral method increased in importance, causing the significance of lead advertising to decline. 113 In spite of
the foregoing, Beltone had difficulty penetrating the referral segment of the market, undoubtedly a cause of its declining market
share." 4 The FTC stated, "We are not interested so much in
whether Beltone's practices ultimately help it to prevail in the
marketplace; rather, our concern here is whether the restrictions reasonably serve Beltone's market objectives."' " 5 On this
last point, Commissioner Bailey observed that a manufacturer's
after-the-fact justifications do not deserve great attention when
the question is net competitive effect. 1 6 Nevertheless, the inquiry continued.
Beltone sought to justify its restraint based upon the free
107. Id. at 180-81.
108. Id.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 211 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 9295 (1978)). When a doctor or audiolo-

gist issues a patient a professional referral it is treated by hearing aid dealers as a prescription. The dealer is not allowed to supply the patient with
any type or brand of hearing aid other than that which the referral specifies.
Id. at 181. Thus, with increasing use of this method, hearing aid firms are
turning their marketing efforts toward persuasion of hearing professionals

and away from direct persuasion of users.
113. Id. at 181-82.
114. Id. at 182.
115. Id. at 214.
116. Id. at 224-25 (Bailey, C., concurring).
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rider analysis. 1 i7 Lead advertising is subject to such analysis
because the finder of a lead needs protection from free riders. A
referral, on the other hand, is less susceptible because less local
effort is required. 118 Complaint counsel argued, however, that in
either method there is little comparative shopping by consumers, especially on the matter of price. Complaint counsel reasoned that free riding is not a problem under either marketing
method. 119 However, the FT1C determined that under both
methods, pre-sale promotion is necessary for effective market
penetration. Protection from free riders is therefore deemed
necessary. But if consumers do not shop around, protection is
not needed.
Removal of the restraint might yield duplication or overlap
of efforts, reducing a dealer's incentive to advertise. 120 Although
Commissioner Clanton conceded that the manufacturer's desire
to avoid duplication is only "related to the free rider issue,"'121 he
stated that the desire to avoid duplication does concern the
question of efficient utilization of resources. The FTC stated
that such a question is a legitimate concern of the manufacturer. 22 Furthermore, it was asserted that the chosen restraint
is rationally related to the desired goal. 23 Complaint counsel's
argument that there existed less onerous means to that end was
24
rejected by the FTC as contrary to industry experience.
117. Id. at 188, 214-17. Beltone asserted that the restraints are necessary
in order to prevent "non-service-oriented dealers [from freeriding] on the
substantial investment of those dealers who undertake the costly and
painstaking process of identifying and following up leads." Id. at 214. They
also asserted that the restraints allow the lead advertising system to operate efficiently; dealers selling only Beltone products to Beltone leads and
devoting primary attention to their areas of primary marketing responsibil-

ity. Id.

118. Less local effort is required because in referral sales, the only advertising that is worthwhile is advertising and promotion directed to professionals. This type of advertising can be done on a national level, whereas
lead advertising cannot. See infra note 124.
119. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 215.
120. Id. at 216.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 213. The FrC stated that the restraints that were part of
Beltone's marketing plan had a "rational and efficient connection" to its
competitive objective, i.e., protecting its lead promoting activity. Id. at 216.
124. Id. at 214-17. Complaint counsel contended that Beltone could maintain its national lead advertising simply by allocating leads to pre-selected
dealers and insisted that only Beltone products be sold to Beltone leads.
Id. at 216. However, another hearing aid manufacturer testified that it had
to abandon its national lead advertising program because it became too difficult to assign leads after signing a consent agreement barring its usage of
exclusive territories. Id. at 215 n.63.
Complaint counsel further contended that there is sufficient incentive
for dealers to penetrate and serve the market. Id. at 216. However, the FrC
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Finally, the FTC determined that the "complicated combination of hardware and service ... [and the] considerable education and selling effort required to persuade prospective
customers of their need for a hearing aid" made the protection
of exclusivity important to Beltone. 125 The FTC noted that the
hearing aid market is not one "where products are homogenous
and easily accessible to buyers, with brand recognition and
price the principal selling points." 126 In such an industry,
greater antitrust scrutiny presumably would be necessary. The
soft drink industry, it appears, might be so characterized. Nevertheless, the FTC concluded that given the peculiarities of the
hearing aid market, the complainant had not met its burden of
proving that the Beltone practices actually impaired interbrand
128
competition. 127 The complaint was dismissed accordingly.
PART III: CHAOs

REIGNS

When the Supreme Court abandoned the per se approach to
vertical territorial restraints, the rule of reason was substituted
because of the desire to determine illegality based upon "objective benchmarks."'1 29 While the Court offered little guidance as
to what these benchmarks are, the Sylvania case did pose some
hypothetical situations in which vertical territorial restraints
could be used procompetitively. 130 Of course, it was conceded
that these restraints suppress intrabrand competition. 131 Perhaps that is why the Court did not bless all these restraints. In
fact, the Court did not approve of Sylvania's system, but rather,
remanded the case to the lower court for application of the rule
of reason.13 2 The Supreme Court thus left the lower courts virtually on their own to fashion an approach to territorial
restraints.
A similar change took place at the FTC. In Coca-Cola, the
FTC followed the Sylvania lead and applied the rule of reason
to Coca-Cola's system of territorial restrictions. The FTC found
disagreed, saying that the incentive does not necessarily foster promotion
of a particular manufacturer's product. Beltone's current marketing system
is designed to insure that dealers are encouraged to specifically promote its
brand of hearing aid, and not other brands. Id.
125. Id. at 216-17.
126. Id. at 216.
127. Id. at 218.
128. Id.
129. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
130. Id. at 54-56.
131. Id. at 54.
132. Id. The Supreme Court in actuality affirmed the remand order of
the lower court. Sylvania v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.
1976), affid, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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that the restraints in the soft drink industry had the potential to
produce significant anticompetitive effects on both the intrabrand and interbrand levels. 133 The FTC indicated that it
would continue to scrutinize these restraints carefully. A few
years later, however, the FTC turned in the other direction and
went beyond the dictates of Sylvania by virtually granting carte
blanche to manufacturers who engage in territorial restraints.
A comparison of the Coca-Cola and Beltone opinions, however, indicates more than a shift to a new standard of liability.
Beltone typifies the growing influence of those antitrust scholars
who believe that vertical restraints should seldom be prohibited.1M Even though Coca-Cola and its competitors are now free
135
to engage in those restraints found unreasonable by the FTC,'
there is reason to believe that the soft drink industry and the
consuming public would both be better off without these restraints. The same can be said about other industries. But the
sad truth is that with Beltone as precedent, the FTC probably
will not prohibit most vertical restraints and needed competition will never be injected into the soft drink industry.
Even if this is not the case, the FTC has missed an opportunity to shed light upon the evasive standard under which the
legality of these restrictions is assessed. Instead of using CocaCola as a starting point and building upon the base established
in that case, the FTC announced a new approach to these
problems and completely ignored the precedent. 36 As a result,
the law remains as confused as ever, and lawyers and business
persons are left with little guidance on this troublesome issue.
Commissioner Clanton, the dissenter in Coca-Cola and the
author of the Beltone opinion, conceded the reduction in intrabrand competition. He stated that complaint counsel must
demonstrate a reduction of interbrand competition in order to
succeed. 137 Although interbrand competition is of primary concern, the FTC now seems to have elevated it to the only concern.
If interbrand competition exists in an industry, restricted distribution systems will be granted approval.
The Supreme Court has stated that the rule of reason requires a balancing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. 38 The FTC has modified the rule by eliminating from
133. See In re Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. 517, 619, 640 (1978).
134. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTRrusT PARADox 288 (1978); Posner, supra
note 73, at 6.
135. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

136. The Coca-Cola case was not cited or even distinguished in Beltone.
137. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 218.
138. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
691 (1978); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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consideration the obvious anticompetitive effect of intrabrand
competition. The FTC's approach is thus at odds with the
Court's.
Nevertheless, the FTC's attempt to develop a new approach
is not entirely without merit. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
actually balance competition in different sectors of the marketplace. In fact, it is the competitive interaction in that marketplace which must produce the proper balance between
intrabrand and interbrand competition. A better formula for
analysis of net competitive effect is therefore welcome. Because
territorial restraints invariably eliminate intrabrand competition, it may actually be best to remove that factor from the analysis. It is quite different from the Sylvania standard, however,
to eliminate the intrabrand factor and then to demand that the
complainant also demonstrate an adverse effect upon interbrand competition. To do so ignores much of the anticompetitive potential of vertical territorial restraints. The new rule of
reason thus grants to would-be restrainers a great advantage
when they stand before the FTC.
In Beltone, the FTC focused its analysis upon a search for
the most likely anticompetitive interbrand effects. Among these
evils are horizontal collusion, attainment or abuse of inordinate
market power and pricing interdependence. 1 39 Neither collusion nor market power was seen as a significant problem in the
hearing aid industry. 14° Rather, the inquiry concentrated on interdependence, a not uncommon but pernicious practice in our
competitive economy. Interdependence, or tacit coordination,
often results in prices which tend to remain stable, largely unaf14 1
fected by free market forces.
In Beltone, Commissioner Clanton searched for the various
structural indicia of industries most susceptible to interdependent behavior. Among these indicia are the extent of concentration, product homogeneity, and barriers to new entry.142 The
greater the possibility that interdependence exists, the greater
the potential becomes for restricted distribution to harm competition. Also, the need increases for interbrand competition to
1 43
provide the necessary stimulus.
Based upon these indicia, the hearing aid market was found
139. In re Beltone Electronics Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 206-07.
140. Id. at 211-13.
141. See L.

SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST,

(1977).
142. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 211.
143. Id. at 212.

330-343
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to be largely unsusceptible to industry coordination. 14 The industry was not sufficiently concentrated. 145 No guidelines were
offered to indicate what concentration levels would cause concern to the FTC. Entry into the field was deemed not to be
overly difficult; 146 in fact, there had been several new entrants in
recent years. The FTC also observed that the various hearing
aid brands are not always interchangeable; 147 a fact which was
offered as proof that interdependence was unlikely.
Nevertheless, certain features of the market did indicate a
potential for interdependence. For instance, the fact that demand for hearing aids is inelastic and that buyers are not pricesensitive causes the industry to be fertile ground for interdependence. 148 Furthermore, entry was not as easy as the FTC had
indicated. But, in the final analysis, the FTC's assessment of the
nature of interbrand competition in the hearing aid industry
spelled victory for the respondents,
How does the soft drink industry fare under this analysis?
While there is a great proliferation of soft drink brands, a deeper
look into the market leads one to conclude that interdependence, or at least price insensitivity, reduces competition at the
bottler level. The number of bottlers in each region is greatly
reduced. Already one can see an unhealthy situation.
A deeper look into precisely how these bottlers' decisions
interact raises even greater concern. Bottlers who sell a multiplicity of soft drink brands have a disincentive to cut prices. A
bottler who cuts prices on one or a number of brands will increase his sales volume in those brands, but only at the expense
of his other brands. A bottler who cuts prices on all his brands
may improve his sales volume in the short run, but in the long
run, his rivals will also have to cut their prices. This would result in lower profits for the industry as a whole. Because the
bottlers wish to avoid this self-destructive price cutting, they refrain from cutting prices at all. Instead, the bottler must seek
other methods of expanding his sales, such as advertising and
other forms of product promotion. He cannot seek out new customers in other areas because of the territorial restraints. As a
144. Id.
145. This was true even though the top four and eight firm concentration
ratios were 50% and 70% respectively. Id. at 182.
146. But see, infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.

147. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 181, 216. Interchangeability is low for two reasons: (1) professional referrals take the form of prescriptions, and the

brand prescribed cannot be altered by either the customer or the dealer;
and (2) certain hearing aid brands are better for some maladies and not
effective for others. Id. at 181.
148. Id. at 212.
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result, advertising budgets grow and inelastic demand causes
149
prices to rise.
Remove the restraints, and the situation changes dramatically. With the ability to enter new territories, the bottler has a
practical way to improve his business. He will do so by challenging neighboring competitors with new entry and lower
prices. Even if he does not actually enter the neighbor's territory, his presence as a potential competitor will have a positive
effect upon the entire market. Prices in the territory will thus
remain at competitive levels in order to dissuade entry by neighbors. Uncertainty and the challenge of competition will stimulate free market forces and insure proper resource allocation.
Insulation from uncertainty and competition is dangerous, and
the FTC in Coca-Cola was well advised to inject intrabrand competition into the marketplace. 150
The same is not necessarily true for hearing aids. Important
distinctions exist between that market and the market for soft
drinks. Soft drink sales are clearly price sensitive, 15 1 while the
evidence in the hearing aid industry was to the contrary. 152 The
various brands of hearing aids are more effective than others for
certain maladies. 153 Soft drink brands generally are interchangeable. Furthermore, unalterable prescriptions often dictate the hearing aid brand to be purchased. 154 Shopping
convenience greatly affects the location where that purchase
will take place. 5 5 And while injection of intrabrand competition
into the hearing aid market would undoubtedly increase the options available to some purchasers, 5 6 the net effect on all purchasers is likely to be small. Evidence indicated that most
consumers of hearing aids base their purchase upon non-price
considerations, and would continue to do so even if the re15 7
straints were removed.
149. Where demand is inelastic, a small change in price will produce a
smaller reduction in the quantity consumers will purchase. In such a case,
the large part of cost increases are passed on to the public. The reverse
would be true of products with elastic demand. See generally, P. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMIcs, 381-82 (10th ed. 1976). In this sense, the advertising distortion acts as an excise tax.
150. But see Posner, supra note 73, at 16.
151. See In re Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. 517, 640-42 (1978).
152. In re Beltone, 100 F.T.C. 68, 212 (1982).
153. See Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 181, 217.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 213.
156. This would be for those purchasers who would shop around. See id.
at 213-14.
157. Id.
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The Beltone opinion, however, has several fundamental
flaws, at least some of which are rooted in the superficiality of
the FTC's inquiry. For instance, it is observed that entry into
the hearing aid market has not been overly difficult. 15 8 But
much of this entry was the product of the marketing method,
i.e., professional referrals. Some new firms have been able to
penetrate this new section of the market, often at the expense of
existing firms. Yet as firms settle into the new marketing approach, entry will become more difficult.
Other characteristics of the industry indicate that entry
could be a problem. Professionals generally make the decision
as to which hearing aid brand will be purchased; they are unlikely to be overly sensitive to price. Advertising and other nonprice promotions are made all the more important, a condition
observed in Coca-Cola.159 Where that is the case, the minimum
capital required for entry is pushed higher. Therefore, entry
into the hearing aid market is actually more difficult than the
FTC believed.
The system of product exclusivity engaged in by Beltone
only exaggerates the difficult entry by forcing new manufacturing entrants to simultaneously enter on the distribution level.
Dual entry is always expensive, often impossible, and can be the
product of restricted distribution. Yet, in the final analysis, the
existence of Beltone's restraints was unlikely to produce significant anticompetitive effects, although this had little to do with
the level of interbrand competition in the marketplace. Rather
it is because Beltone is the only major manufacturer of hearing
aids who may engage in territorial restraints and product exclusivity. Other major competitors are precluded from doing so by
an FTC consent order. 160 Beltone accounts for only 16% of hearing aid sales and only 8% of the dealers nationwide. 16 1 Thus, the
amount of actual and potential competition foreclosed is really
somewhat small. A large enough segment of the market remains open to all firms. Beltone's restraint is thus less likely to
be anticompetitive than if the entire industry were engaged in
the scheme. This rather simple observation is also lacking from
the FTC's analysis.
An industry-wide system of vertical restraints can produce
other undesirable effects. Emphasis on nonprice competition is
often the result of these arrangements. Commissioner Dole in
Coca-Cola found that this emphasis resulted in unprofitable ac158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 184, 211.
See Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 628-30.
Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 223 (Bailey, C., concurring).
Id. at 210.
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counts and unnecessary dealer services. 162 Intrabrand monopoly causes some buyers to purchase a product and its related
service even when the service is unwanted if all sellers are offering both. A new entrant could take advantage of these consumers, but new entry is not always feasible and is almost always
subject to a time lag. If, however, a neighboring bottler could
enter the territory, then he could provide the product without
the undesired service.
The usual response to this argument is that the invaders
would take a free ride on the existing firm's point-of-sale services. This argument, however, is not always meritorious, as a
comparison of Coca-Cola and Beltone indicates. In the latter
case, lead advertising was encouraged by the restrictions on location. It is important to note that the dealer who engages in
this practice is the dealer most likely to benefit from his efforts.
The same is not true of Coca-Cola. While it is true that the
restraints did encourage product promotion by dealers, the FTC
found that at least some of these promotions were unprofitable
for the dealer. 163 The dealers, therefore, did not benefit from the
promotional activities. That benefit inured either to the manufacturer or to other dealers. This practice of free riding by the
manufacturer was condemned by Commissioner Dole. She
stated that there was little reason to permit a healthy competitor,164 such as Coca-Cola, to engage in such burden-shifting
165
activities.
Another crucial difference between the cases lies in the nature of the product sold. Compared to soft drinks, hearing aids
are a more complicated product, requiring greater selling effort.1 6 6 Commissioner Clanton concluded that in the hearing aid
industry, "there is more justification for manufacturers to seek
ways of motivating dealers"' 67 than in a market where the price
of the product and familiarity of the brand are the major selling
162. See Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 627-28 (unprofitable activities) and 623-25
(delivery services).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 631. Compare Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36,
38 (1977) and Sandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847, 854, 858 (6th Cir. 1964) with

In re Coca-Cola, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978).
165. The argument presented here is not a simple "less restrictive alternative" analysis. Rather, Commissioner Dole found no evidence that Coke
"must depend upon its bottlers for funds to sponsor ...advertising." CocaCola at 631. Her argument seems more akin to a "reasonably necessary"

standard, which Coca-Cola obviously could not meet.
166. Beltone, 100 F.T.C. at 216. See supra note 125 and accompanying
text.
167. Id. at 217.
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points. Yet this observation is made by Commissioner Clanton
only in passing, and is not expanded upon at all.
From these distinctions, Commissioner Clanton and the
FTC could have identified the "objective benchmarks" the
Supreme Court deemed necessary and those we seek. Instead,
we are left with a new approach, an inconsistent precedent, and
another sui generis decision. What we are not left with is an
understanding of how to properly apply the elusive rule of reason to manufacturer-imposed territorial restraints. It has been
the
suggested by some that the FTC is now taking or should take
168
If
view that restrictive distribution be deemed lawful per se.
this is true, the FTC should say so rather than hide behind the
guise of so revered a rule as the rule of reason.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis demonstrates some of the clear distinctions which could have been drawn between the soft drink
and hearing aid industries. Courts should draw upon these distinctions in order to develop a rational approach which will provide guidelines for business. The FTC has not done so. By
approaching the Beltone case sui generis, the FTC said little of
what it will do in the future. In such a complex area as this, we
need to know more about how the Commission will decide a
case. The Beltone opinion does not satisfy this need.

168. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 73. See also Axinn & Stoll, Vertical NonPrice Restrictions-TheMove Toward Per Se Legality, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1983,
at 1, col. 7.

